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PROSECUTORIAL DECRIMINALIZATION
ERIK LUNA*
I. INTRODUCTION
As far as I can tell, Sanford Kadish coined the term
“overcriminalization” in a 1962 article in the Harvard Law Review, where
he noted the phenomenon of “criminal statutes which seem deliberately to
overcriminalize, in the sense of encompassing conduct not the target of
legislative concern.”1 After listing a few examples of overcriminalization,
such as overly broad bans on gambling and strict liability statutes, Professor
Kadish mentioned that these laws “raise basic issues of a morally
acceptable criminal code,” insofar as they “purport to bring within the
condemnation of the criminal statute kinds of activities whose moral
neutrality, if not innocence, is widely recognized.”2 He was not the first
prominent scholar to articulate the basic problem, however.3 A few years
earlier, for instance, Francis Allen had noted “the sheer bulk of penal
regulations,” “the accelerating rate at which these accretions to the criminal
law have occurred,” and “the remarkable range of human activities now
subject to the threat of criminal sanctions.”4 Indeed, the breadth of penal

*

Sydney and Frances Lewis Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School
of Law.
1
Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes,
75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1962).
2
Id. at 910.
3
At the turn of the previous century, Roscoe Pound noted “the crude and unorganized
character of American legislation in a period when the growing point of law has drifted to
legislation.” Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 748 (1906). He would later point out that, “of one hundred
thousand persons arrested in Chicago in 1912, more than one half were held for violation of
legal precepts which did not exist twenty-five years before.” ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 23 (1930).
4
Francis A. Allen, The Borderland of the Criminal Law: Problems of “Socializing”
Criminal Justice, 32 SOC. SERV. REV. 107, 108 (1958).
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codes and overloading of criminal justice systems were common themes of
reform efforts throughout the twentieth century.5
Nonetheless, Professor Kadish provided a single word that crystalized
the phenomenon—hardly a small accomplishment in a legal and political
culture often affected by labels. In the coming years, Kadish and his
contemporaries would describe various manifestations and repercussions of
overcriminalization in the state and federal systems.6 The use of criminal
law to enforce public standards of private morality, as in the case of drug
offenses, failed to suppress either supply or demand. Instead, drug
criminalization increased black-market profits and related offenses, required
police to engage in devious practices due to the covert and consensual
nature of the narcotics trade, and diverted limited resources from the
enforcement and adjudication of serious harms.7 As for regulatory offenses,
much of the conduct in question closely resembled business behavior that
was “not only socially acceptable, but affirmatively desirable” in an
economic system premised on free enterprise.8 In these situations, “the
stigma of moral reprehensibility” did not intuitively attach to the regulated
behavior.9 Rather, each addition of morally neutral conduct to the penal
code further diluted the normative force of the criminal sanction.
Professor Kadish warned that, “until these problems of
overcriminalization are systematically examined and effectively dealt with,
some of the most besetting problems of criminal-law administration are
bound to continue.”10 His prognosis remains as true today as when he
offered it in 1967. As my contribution to this Symposium, I will suggest
another way of looking at overcriminalization that reconceptualizes the
problem and offers a second-best approach to dealing with the
phenomenon’s most troubling expressions. Regardless of any prescriptive
possibilities, maybe the neologism itself, like the one coined by Professor

5
See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”:
American Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 597
(2011).
6
See Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in
Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 432 (1963) [hereinafter Kadish,
Some Observations]; Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157, 158 (1967) [hereinafter Kadish, Crisis of
Overcriminalization]; see also NORVAL MORRIS & GORDON HAWKINS, THE HONEST
POLITICIAN’S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL (1970); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 250–366 (1969); Frank J. Remington, The Limits and Possibilities of
the Criminal Law, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 865, 865 (1968).
7
See Kadish, Crisis of Overcriminalization, supra note 6, at 163–65.
8
Kadish, Some Observations, supra note 6, at 436.
9
Id. at 425–26.
10
Kadish, Crisis of Overcriminalization, supra note 6, at 158.
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Kadish a half-century ago, might help people rethink the status quo. Before
considering the basic idea—what I call “prosecutorial decriminalization”—
the following provides some background on overcriminalization and the
prospects for change.
II. REFORM PROSPECTS
On occasion, Professor Kadish was called upon to respond to those
who rejected the arguments against overcriminalization as being
theoretically unprincipled or, conversely, uselessly abstract.11 Yet today,
decades after he introduced the phrase into the legal lexicon,
overcriminalization is acknowledged as a serious problem—not only by
academics, but also by eminent jurists, former high-ranking government
officials, and organizations from across the political spectrum12—inspiring
books, law review symposia, and congressional hearings.13
The
phenomenon can be seen as encompassing an assortment of issues,
including:
 offenses deficient in clearly harmful wrongdoing (e.g., vice
crimes and many non-larcenous economic offenses);
 duplicative penal provisions and novel crimes already well
covered by existing law (e.g., carjacking);
 statutes passed without genuine jurisdictional authority (e.g.,
federal offenses with specious links to interstate commerce);
 doctrines that can expand liability to those who hardly seem
blameworthy (e.g., strict liability and vicarious liability); and
 harsh punishments that bear no necessary relationship to the
harm caused or threatened by the offense and the
11

See Sanford H. Kadish, Comment: The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
1247, 1249 (1995) [hereinafter Kadish, Folly of Overfederalization]; Sanford H. Kadish,
More on Overcriminalization: A Reply to Professor Junker, 19 UCLA L. REV. 719, 719
(1972).
12
See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Ensnared,
WALL ST. J., July 23, 2011, at A1; Adam Liptak, Right and Left Join to Take On U.S. in
Criminal Justice Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2009, at A1.
13
See, e.g., Reining in Overcriminalization: Assessing the Problem, Proposing
Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); Over-Criminalization of Conduct/OverFederalization of Criminal Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); GO DIRECTLY TO
JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING (Gene Healy ed., 2004); DOUGLAS
HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008); IN THE NAME OF
JUSTICE: LEADING EXPERTS REEXAMINE THE CLASSIC ARTICLE “THE AIMS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW” (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009); Symposium, Overcriminalization 2.0: Developing
Consensus Solutions, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 565 (2011); Symposium, Overcriminalization:
The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005).
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blameworthiness of the offender (e.g., some mandatory
minimum sentencing laws).14
This understanding of overcriminalization, shared in whole or in part
by those who seek to contain or reverse the phenomenon, is indicative of a
newfound appreciation for the legitimate ends of criminal law. With a
convergence of opinion, the discussion inevitably turns to a search for
answers—and just as inevitably, two solutions have been offered by
scholars and reformers. The first option would be for lawmakers to address
overcriminalization by trimming the penal code, with a scalpel in some
places and a hatchet in others. This approach seems preferable to all others,
given that a legislature possesses the most straightforward means to deal
with the problem. Besides, lawmakers are the ones who created the mess to
begin with, by continually expanding the reach of criminal justice systems,
enacting new crimes, providing for harsher punishments, and broadening
culpability principles, often in the absence of deontological or empirical
justification and without regard for statutory redundancy or jurisdictional
limitations. A variation on this theme calls for the depoliticization of at
least the initial steps of criminal lawmaking by shifting responsibility for
defining crimes and setting punishments in the first instance from
lawmakers to non-political criminal justice experts.15
The second option involves the imposition of the judiciary as a check
on overcriminalization. Over the years, this approach has been advocated
by a number of leading scholars, each offering his or her own theory of
judicial review. Among others, the late, great William Stuntz considered
the potential of constitutionalizing substantive criminal law—through a
minimum mens rea requirement, for example, and revitalized rules of
desuetude and notice—all as a means to limit the power of lawmakers to
ban and punish conduct.16 In a subsequent article, Professor Stuntz
suggested a prerequisite of regularized enforcement, where the government
would have to show that a sufficient number of similarly situated
defendants had been convicted of the crime charged against the accused,
and that a minimum number of factually analogous cases resulted in

14

See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 704–17
(2005) [hereinafter Overcriminalization Phenomenon].
15
See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 582–87 (2001) [hereinafter Pathological Politics]. In his article, Professor Stuntz was
not advocating the depoliticization approach. Indeed, he suggests that “expert-driven
criminal law is a practical impossibility.” Id. at 585.
16
See id. at 587–98; William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil–Criminal Line,
7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 31–38 (1996); see also Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a
Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 530–70 (2004); Claire
Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 358–93 (2000).
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sentences as severe as the one imposed in the case at bar.17 Such proposals
make a great deal of sense in light of the fundamental role of the judiciary
as a countermajoritarian safeguard against political excesses.18
Unfortunately, neither of these overarching solutions has had much
traction, due in large part to the dysfunctional political process that expands
but never contracts the criminal justice system. In 1995, Professor Kadish
summed up the typical cycle of “creeping and foolish” overcriminalization:
Some dramatic crimes or series of crimes are given conspicuous media coverage,
producing what is perceived, and often is, widespread public anxiety. Seeking to
make political hay, some legislator proposes a new law to make this or that a major
felony or to raise the penalty or otherwise tighten the screws. Since other legislators
know well that no one can lose voter popularity for seeming to be tough on crime, the
legislation sails through in a breeze. That the chances of the legislation working to
reduce crime are exceedingly low, and in some cases the chances of it doing harm are
19
very high, scarcely seems to be a relevant issue.

In this sadly familiar account of criminal justice politics20—one which
is consistent with the sociological theory of “moral panics,” the measured
impact of sensational crime stories, and the collapse of the harm principle
as a legislative limit21—new offenses and harsher punishments become
means to placate constituents and make fodder for reelection campaigns.
There is also a “deeper politics, a politics of institutional competition and
cooperation,” Professor Stuntz argued, that “always pushes toward broader
liability rules, and toward harsher sentences as well.”22 Lawmakers have an
incentive to take symbolic stands through criminal law, and law enforcers
have an interest in disposing of cases and obtaining convictions. All of this
can be achieved by restricting more behavior (and restricting it in more
ways) and increasing sentences, which leads to more and cheaper
convictions via plea bargaining. Together, lawmakers and law enforcers
have a powerful predisposition toward overcriminalization.
For its part, the third branch has done virtually nothing to curb the
phenomenon, having all but abandoned the field of constitutional criminal
17

See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 781, 838–43 (2006) [hereinafter Political Constitution].
18
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 16–17, 34–35 (1996); Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion,
48 DUKE L.J. 787, 824 (1999).
19
Kadish, Folly of Overfederalization, supra note 11, at 1248–49.
20
See Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense,
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 783 (2012).
21
See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 110 (1999); Erik Luna, Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination, 7
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 81–86 (2009).
22
Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 15, at 510.
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law. Outside of a few areas—most notably, freedom of expression,
procreative rights, and the death penalty—the courts have been hesitant to
limit lawmakers in their enactment of crimes and punishments. At its
essence, adjudication in the United States is a conservative endeavor,
constrained by notions of stare decisis and the obligation to justify
deviations from past precedent.23 Perhaps more than its co-equals, the
judiciary is cognizant of its own institutional limitations.24 The courts are
also “haunted” by the “ghost of Lochner”25 and thus careful to avoid the
semblance of a super-legislature. As a practical matter, judicial reticence to
counter overcriminalization may be partially attributed to the lack of clearcut standards. For instance, at what point does a term of imprisonment
become “cruel and unusual”?26 Whatever the reason, the courts are unlikely
to be a significant source of criminal law reform.
All hope is not lost, however. When the seemingly irresistible force of
the new reform coalition meets the apparently immoveable object of
pathological politics, something must give. With any luck, this faux
paradox will be resolved by legislative action that either directly or
indirectly tackles the problems of overcriminalization. The former might be
foreshadowed by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,27 which eliminated the
mandatory five-year sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine—the
first time a federal mandatory minimum had been repealed since the Nixon
Administration28—while also reducing the sentencing disparity between
crack and powder cocaine.
As for indirect reform, Senator Jim Webb introduced legislation to
create a National Criminal Justice Commission. This bipartisan body
would
undertake a comprehensive review of the criminal justice system, make findings
related to current Federal and State criminal justice policies and practices, and make
reform recommendations for the President, Congress, and State governments to
improve public safety, cost-effectiveness, overall prison administration, and fairness
29
in the implementation of the Nation’s criminal justice system.

23

See, e.g., Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 17, at 846.
Cf. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES ch. 2 (4th
ed. 2011) (discussing limits on federal judicial power).
25
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905); see, e.g., Robert C. Post,
Lecture, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 1489, 1494 (1998).
26
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
27
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.
28
See, e.g., Molly M. Gill, Correcting Course: Lessons from the 1970 Repeal of
Mandatory Minimums, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 55, 55 (2008).
29
National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009, S. 714, 111th Cong. § 4.
24
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By all appearances, the proposed task force would be an excellent vehicle to
examine overcriminalization and to suggest meaningful reforms. Given the
likely stature of the commission’s membership and the backing of
numerous organizations,30 the commission might provide the type of
political cover needed for lawmakers to support the recommendations.
To be clear, I am optimistic, not quixotic. The entirely laudable Webb
Commission has been twice blocked by lawmakers and may well die when
its namesake leaves the Senate at year’s end. More generally, the history of
criminal justice commissions has been a mixed bag, with some well-known
achievements but just as many flops.31 As for legislative reform, the Fair
Sentencing Act represents an important but small step. Further reform
efforts still face the longstanding political hurdles discussed above, while at
the same time institutional structures and political incentives will continue
the pressure for more crimes and harsher punishments.32 Recent events
may augur certain well-crafted, targeted legislative modifications, which
might set the stage for greater reforms.33 But the political environment does
not appear conducive to rapid, wholesale change to criminal law—at least
not yet.
III. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
What is to be done in the meantime, during the interregnum between
our overcriminalized present and a hopefully more reasonable future?
Here, I would like to suggest another way of looking at overcriminalization.
The relevant concept, “prosecutorial decriminalization,” has both positive
and normative aspects. The descriptive claim is that prosecutors have the
power to decriminalize conduct and, in fact, they are already doing it en
masse. The prescriptive claim is that this power, when exercised openly
and pursuant to public reason, can ameliorate some of the problems of
overcriminalization.
The descriptive argument is straightforward—and, I think, relatively
uncontroversial—involving just a few moves. First, the prosecutorial

30

See Letter from S. 714 Coalition Supporters to Senator Jim Webb (Sept. 15, 2010),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/38089190/S-714-Coalition-Supporters.
31
See, e.g., Luna, Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 730–31.
32
See, e.g., Legislative Update, OVERCRIMINALIZED.COM, http://overcriminalized.com/
Legislation.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) (describing a Heritage Foundation project
providing “details, status, and basic commentary on legislation pending in Congress that
could perpetuate the dangerous trend of criminalizing more and more conduct that is socially
and economically beneficial and of punishing Americans for acts they commit without
criminal intent”).
33
Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4
(2010).

792

ERIK LUNA

[Vol. 102

function is steeped in discretion, which, as used here, simply means the
power to choose between two or more courses of conduct.34 Discretion is a
“residual concept,” as James Vorenberg suggested, “the room left for
subjective judgment” after taking into consideration the applicable
constraints, most notably, statutes and court decisions.35 Or to use Ronald
Dworkin’s famous simile, discretion is “like the hole of a doughnut,” which
“does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of
restriction.”36
In the present context, when the legislature declares certain behavior
criminal and attaches a particular punishment, prosecutors exercise virtually
limitless discretion to administer the relevant code section.37 The courts
will not demand that charges be leveled; nor will they upset a prosecutor’s
decision to bring charges;38 nor are judges likely to hinder plea negotiations
and the concomitant agreements.39 As then-Judge Warren Burger opined,
“Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the
Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute
criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to
dismiss a proceeding once brought.”40 The primary legal checks are the
burdens of proof to charge and convict—respectively, probable cause and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt41—along with the obligations of pretrial
and trial procedure. In practice, however, the process scuttles few cases
brought in earnest.42
Even in a world without overcriminalization, one might expect that the
scope of prosecutorial discretion would be substantial. The boundaries of
language and foresight prevent a legislature from formulating rules in every
law enforcement scenario. For this reason, lawmakers may prefer general
terms that capture broad swaths of conduct, ensuring that wrongdoers do
34
See, e.g., Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1133 (2000). See
generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
35
James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 651, 654; see also Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The
Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 926 (1960); Peter Westen,
The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV.
604, 642 (1983).
36
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977).
37
Except, as mentioned previously, when a statute touches on topics such as speech and
procreation. See supra text accompanying notes 23–26.
38
See Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1413, 1418 nn.15–16 (2010).
39
Id. at 1418 n.17.
40
Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
41
See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970).
42
See Luna & Wade, supra note 38, at 1418 n.18.
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not escape punishment through an inadvertent loophole. The necessity of
political compromise also lends itself to statutory imprecision, freeing
lawmakers from having to make hard decisions that could upset voters or
interest groups.43 Moreover, vague statutes may garner more votes and take
less time to navigate the legislative process, while still placating the
public’s desire for action.44
In the current reality of grotesque overcriminalization, however,
prosecutorial discretion is awe-inspiring. Consider the power wielded by
federal prosecutors as a result of the approximately 4,500 provisions that
are punishable as crimes,45 with the largest portion enacted after Professor
Kadish first warned of overcriminalization.46 In effect, the federal
government has arrogated to itself a general police power to enact virtually
any offense, creating an enormous criminal code—if you can call it a
“code”—filled with repetitive and overlapping statutes, covering behavior
already well covered by state law,47 spinning a web of regulatory crimes,48

43

Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 5, 10 (1997).
44
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 469, 474–75 (1996); Kahan, supra note 43, at 9–11.
45
See JOHN S. BAKER, JR., HERITAGE FOUND., REVISITING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF
FEDERAL CRIMES (2008), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2008/
pdf/lm26.pdf. Actually, the number is probably much larger, due to the thousands of
regulations that do not appear in federal statutes yet carry the possibility of criminal
penalties. See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Criminal Code Is Overgrown, Legal
Experts Tell Panel, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2011, at A8 (quoting former U.S. Attorney
General Edwin Meese); see also Many Failed Efforts to Count Nation’s Federal Criminal
Laws, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2011, at A10. Apparently, the Congressional Research Service
gave up an attempt to calculate the amount of separate federal crimes on the books. Rough
Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2010, at 26,
28. The Justice Department has acknowledged that the number cannot be quantified. Fields
& Emshwiller, supra note 12 (citing Justice Department spokeswoman).
46
See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, REPORT OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 n.9 (1998) (revealing “startling fact” that “[m]ore than
40% of the federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since
1970,” and noting that “[m]uch, though not all, of this surge has occurred in the last two
decades”).
47
See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1090–1103 (10th Cir. 2003)
(upholding, inter alia, a federal felony indictment for violation of Utah’s commercial bribery
statute, a misdemeanor under state law).
48
See, e.g., PAUL ROSENZWEIG, HERITAGE FOUND., THE OVER-CRIMINALIZATION OF
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDUCT (2003), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/
2003/pdf/lm7.pdf.
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and extending federal jurisdiction to all kinds of deception and wrongdoing
across the nation and around the globe.49
Although perhaps not as virulent and prone to less criticism,50
overcriminalization has also taken place at the state level. For instance,
Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill point to the Illinois Criminal Code—
which is now a dozen times longer than the original code—as a case in
point on the “accelerating degradation” of American criminal codes through
enactment of new offenses, expansion of existing crimes, and increases in
punishment.51 Rather than employing the power to criminalize for socially
beneficial purposes, most state legislatures have become “offense
factories.”52
As a result, it is not altogether hyperbolic to say that everyone is a
criminal (or at least a potential scofflaw). In 2005, I suggested that
American society may be approaching a watershed point of criminal law,
what one book aptly titled “the criminalization of almost everything.”53 A
few years earlier, Professor Stuntz had made a similar prediction that,
absent major changes, “we are likely to come ever closer to a world in
which the law on the books makes everyone a felon.”54 The basic concern
actually traces back several decades. Then-U.S. Attorney General Robert
Jackson observed in 1940, “With the law books filled with a great
assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a
technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone.”55 In the new
millennium, the we’re-all-criminals idea is truer than ever, whether the
public recognizes it or not. “[M]ost people think of criminals as bad

49

See, e.g., Luna, Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 709–10. But see
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010) (limiting the scope of “honest
services” fraud).
50
As compared to the federal government, the states at least possess a constitutionally
legitimate police power. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566–67 (1995).
51
Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the
States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 172 (2003); Paul H. Robinson &
Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 633, 635–38 (2005). Professor Stuntz made similar findings with regard to
the criminal codes of Massachusetts and Virginia. Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note
15, at 514. But see, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 223, 227–28 (2007).
52
Robinson & Cahill, supra note 51, at 634.
53
See Luna, Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 746 (referring to GO
DIRECTLY TO JAIL, supra note 15).
54
Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 15, at 511.
55
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
3, 5 (1940).
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people, who deserve punishment,” Judge Alex Kozinski remarked, “while
not realizing that they are criminals themselves.”56
Prosecutorial discretion thus exists within a Dworkinian doughnut that
encircles us all. In wielding this discretion, prosecutors are the most
powerful actors in the criminal justice system. They decide whether to
accept or decline a case, and, on occasion, whether an individual should be
arrested in the first place; they select what crimes should be charged and the
number of counts; they choose whether to engage in plea negotiations and
the terms of an acceptable agreement; they determine all aspects of pretrial
and trial strategy; and in many cases, they essentially decide the punishment
that will be imposed upon conviction. As such, the prosecutor is the
criminal justice system, in effect making the law, enforcing it against the
accused, adjudicating his guilt, and determining the punishment.57
This bears repeating. Prosecutors not only enforce the criminal code
in the traditional sense, but they also effectively make law and judge cases
through their discretionary decisions. Which brings me to the ultimate
point: In an overcriminalized world, prosecutors are already decriminalizing
conduct through their discretionary decisionmaking—as a matter of fact,
they seem to have no other choice but to do so. In large district attorneys’
offices, each prosecutor can have a caseload of 150 felonies per year or
more; a misdemeanor caseload may be many times larger, sometimes
exceeding a thousand cases per year.58
Needless to say, there is not enough time and resources, either in
prosecutors’ offices or in courtrooms, to try all of these cases. As a rule of
thumb, 25%–50% of all cases referred to prosecutors are declined for
prosecution.59 Although many of these cases are dismissed outright, some
56

Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN THE
NAME OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 44; see also Michelle Alexander, I’m a Criminal and So
Are You, CNN.COM (May 18, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-18/opinion/
alexander.who.am.i_1_law-abiding-felons-criminal?_s=PM:OPINION.
57
See Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Preface, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE at xi, xi (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2012).
58
See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261,
270–74 (2011); see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.10(c) (3d ed.
& Supp. 2011). But see Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself: Discretion and the Problem
of Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143, 143–45 (2011)
(questioning prosecutorial caseload numbers).
59
See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 75 (2002). The declination rate varies widely across jurisdictions and among crime
categories; to the extent the information is made public, the reasons for declining cases vary
widely as well. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1717–20 (2010); Marc L. Miller &
Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 130–31 (2008); Michael Edmund
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may involve pretrial diversion, where charges are dismissed only after the
suspect performs some task or participates in a program. 60 Either way, the
cases are removed from the criminal justice system. Of the cases that do
proceed further into the criminal process, more than 90% are resolved by
plea bargain, which typically involves a defendant pleading guilty in
exchange for reduced charges or a lesser punishment.61
To be sure, a prosecutor might decline a case because of insufficient
proof of a suspect’s guilt or the existence of some legal barrier to
conviction, such as a constitutional violation by the police. But in other
cases, prosecutors abstain from filing charges despite the likelihood of
obtaining convictions.62 As for plea bargaining, it is true that the eventual
crime of conviction and sentence under a given agreement may reflect a
more just assessment of the defendant’s culpability. Still, most plea
bargains result in defendants being convicted of less serious offenses and
receiving reduced punishments than they might otherwise receive under the
law.
In these situations, prosecutors are exercising the fullest expression of
their discretion. By declining a case, the prosecutor is refusing to apply the
penal code to a given suspect. By plea bargaining, the prosecutor is
refusing to apply the most serious crime and the toughest punishment
otherwise applicable to a given defendant. In effect, these prosecutors are
engaged in decriminalization. This will strike some as odd, perhaps a
strange way of describing or aggregating prosecutorial behavior.
Nonetheless, it carries the earmarks of decriminalization, such as removing
or reducing the criminal classification or status of conduct, for instance, or
repealing a strict ban on certain behavior while keeping it under some type
of regulation.63 Through their discretionary decisionmaking, prosecutors
are treating some conduct as non-criminal and handling other conduct as
O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of
Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1440 (2004); Michael Edmund O’Neill,
When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 221, 252 (2003); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 758 (2003).
60
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 58, at § 13.1(d).
61
See SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN
STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES (2009), available at http:bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.5.35.2009 (2010), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
t5352009.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2012); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 67 (2004), available at
http://www.bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs04.pdf.
62
Wright & Miller, supra note 59, at 153.
63
See, e.g., Decriminalize Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/decriminalize (last visited Nov. 23, 2012).
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not quite as criminal as it could be—in other words, prosecutorial
decriminalization.
IV. COVERT DECRIMINALIZATION
This manner of decriminalization raises all sorts of problems. The
plea-bargaining process is infamously coercive, due in large part to
overcriminalization and, in particular, the promulgation of unforgiving
sentencing provisions, often coming in the form of mandatory minimums.
If the defendant refuses to plead guilty and waive his constitutional rights, a
“trial tax” is exacted upon conviction: a sometimes grossly excessive
penalty for exercising his rights.64 Not surprisingly, most defendants take
the plea even when they might have strong culpability defenses or
arguments in mitigation.
More generally, prosecutorial decriminalization tends to be opaque, a
secret law formed by the accumulation of unwritten policies, office
customs, and daily practices. In a sense, it is the latent administrative law
of criminal prosecution that helps account for the many actions that cannot
be explained by reference to penal codes alone. Unlike real administrative
law, however, most prosecutorial decriminalization occurs without the
possibility of public notice and comment. Instead, it is only evident to other
repeat players of criminal justice—police officers, defense attorneys, and
judges—who come to realize the patterns of case declinations and the
“going rate” for plea bargains.65 Those most directly affected by
prosecutorial decriminalization, criminal suspects and defendants, remain
largely oblivious. But so is everyone else. If the common citizen is
unaware that we are all criminals in an overcriminalized nation, he certainly
will not recognize that prosecutors are decriminalizing conduct in bulk.
Because its existence and extent are unknown, prosecutorial
decriminalization is not amenable to the traditional mechanisms of change
in a representative democracy. Legislators and elected chief prosecutors66
serve as professional delegates of a given constituency. For representative
democracy to work—that is, for the will of the people to be served by its
delegates—lawmakers and chief law enforcers must be accessible to the
citizenry, responsive to popular demands, and accountable for their
decisions. Without these elements, “it could well be impossible to make a

64

See, e.g., STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN
AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 38, 83 (2005).
65
See, e.g., Allison O. Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1594
(2011).
66
Even unelected chief prosecutors (e.g., U.S. Attorneys) are answerable to an executive
officer who is subject to the ballot box (e.g., the President).
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rational case that a system is democratic.”67 In the present context, elected
officials will not be held accountable for their role in prosecutorial
decriminalization—whether it be overcriminalizing the system to begin
with or decriminalizing conduct in turn—precisely because the public is not
fully aware of the pertinent decisions and therefore cannot be expected to
participate in meaningful discourse and, if necessary, to demand
government reform.
The secret law of prosecutorial decriminalization is not only hard to
square with a decent model of representative democracy, it also violates a
widely cited interpretation of the rule of law.68 In articulating what he
called the “inner morality of law,”69 Lon Fuller laid out the basic
requirements for a legal command to be worthy of public fidelity rather than
being the imposition of arbitrary power. Specifically, this conception of the
rule of law embraced eight principles: (1) a law should be expressed in
general terms; (2) it should be available to affected parties; (3) it should be
prospective rather than retroactive; (4) it should be clear and
understandable; (5) it should not produce contradictory commands; (6) it
should not require the impossible; (7) it should not frequently change; and
(8) it should be congruent with its enforcement.70
The complete failure of any of these principles “does not simply result
in a bad system of law,” Professor Fuller contended, but “it results in
something that is not properly called a legal system at all.”71 Today’s
overcriminalized justice systems and the reality of covert decriminalization
violate most of these principles. Of course, a system that makes everyone a
criminal might rightly be seen as requiring the impossible. In addition,
much of what has been described as prosecutorial decriminalization is
neither available to affected parties nor understood by the general public.
Most obviously, the current scheme generates a troublesome incongruence
67

Carl F. Pinkele, Discretion Fits Democracy: An Advocate’s Argument, in DISCRETION,
JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY: A PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE 3, 3 (Carl F. Pinkele & William C.
Louthan eds., 1985).
68
The rule of law is an endlessly contested idea, one that philosophers and legal scholars
alike describe as “promiscuous” in its use, Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 211 (1979), “one of the most
elusive concepts in the lexicon of jurisprudence,” Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson,
Introduction: Prospects for the Rule of Law, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 427, 428 (1991), and “less
clear today than ever before,” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1997).
69
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42 (1969). See generally Erik Luna,
Cuban Criminal Justice and the Ideal of Good Governance, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 529, 583–95 (2004) (offering a detailed discussion of the rule of law).
70
See FULLER, supra note 69, at 39; see also Fallon, supra note 68, at 8–9 n.27 (offering
similar elements for the rule of law and stating that they are consistent with Fuller’s criteria).
71
FULLER, supra note 69, at 39.
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between the formal law and its actual administration. “It may not be
impossible for a man to obey a rule that is disregarded by those charged
with its administration,” argued Fuller, “but at some point obedience
becomes futile—as futile, in fact, as casting a vote that will never be
counted.”72
In its clandestine form, prosecutorial decriminalization is not liable to
behavior-shaping rules or after-the-fact review that might help prevent
frequent changes in the effective law and disparate outcomes across cases.
Rather, it can license ad hoc decisionmaking that results in otherwise
similarly situated individuals receiving vastly different consequences. A
criminal law adhocracy is bad enough, but at times the ensuing disparities
can have uncomfortable associations with race and ethnicity.73 Certainly,
there might be a correlation without causation,74 and even causal
relationships may stem from something other than the classic understanding
of prejudice.75 But appearances matter in criminal law enforcement, and
effect may well be taken as intent. The impression if not reality of
capricious decisionmaking and invidious discrimination necessarily
challenges the perceived fairness of the law and its enforcement,
undermining the principal basis for compliance.76
Nonetheless, arguments might be made in favor of prosecutorial
decriminalization, despite the fact people are unaware of its existence or,
instead, precisely because the public is largely oblivious. As mentioned,
law enforcement has a stake in overcriminalization. The expansion of
criminal liability makes it easier to prosecute a course of conduct, and
increased sentences provide defendants a powerful inducement to enter plea
agreements.77 This might seem perfectly acceptable when it leads to the
capture of a dangerous criminal (e.g., the initial arrest of Timothy McVeigh
72

Id.
See, e.g., John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Post-McCleskey
Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1779 (1998).
74
Cf. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1757 (1998).
75
See, e.g., Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race,
Class, and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 531,
536 (1997); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 1016, 1022, 1025 (1988).
76
See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Paul H. Robinson
& John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997).
77
See, e.g., Luna, Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 723–24; Stuntz,
supra note 15, at 519–20, 531. As a former Justice Department official noted, “it is not
surprising that the federal agency charged with preventing, solving, and punishing federal
crimes is not aggressively attempting to shrink the federal code.” RACHEL BRAND, HERITAGE
FOUND., MAKING IT A FEDERAL CASE: AN INSIDE VIEW OF THE PRESSURES TO FEDERALIZE
CRIME 1–2 (2008); see also United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass.
2004).
73
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for a traffic offense), when it provides a ploy to convict the otherwise
invulnerable kingpin (e.g., the prosecution of Al Capone for tax violations),
or when prosecutorial decriminalization helps generate information about a
criminal enterprise (e.g., the lure for an insider to “flip”).
Some might argue that overcriminalization complemented by
prosecutorial decriminalization enhances general deterrence by creating an
“acoustic separation” of sorts.78 The public and, in particular, would-be
criminals recognize the existence of at least some areas of
overcriminalization, such as broad bans and harsh punishments for drug
offenses. But average citizens may not know about prosecutorial
decriminalization, which is understood only by the repeat players of
criminal justice. Because most individuals hear the conduct rule of full
criminalization and not the decision rule of prosecutorial decriminalization,
some people might be deterred from crime that they otherwise would have
committed.79
Although these arguments may not be inherently unsound, it does
seem to me that they are inadequate to outweigh the virtues of government
transparency and democratic accountability. The pretexts provided by
overcriminalization allow law enforcement to skirt criminal procedure
guarantees, almost always to the detriment of minorities and the
underclass.80 Pretextual prosecutions may also send “muddied signals”
about crime and its enforcement, providing inaccurate information to
prospective offenders, government bodies, and the public at large.81
Moreover, acts of decriminalization may at times have less to do with
78

See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (employing the term “acoustic
separation” to the distinction between conduct rules and decisions rules in criminal law);
Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences,
Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996) (same for criminal procedure).
79
In some contexts, people might even favor a scheme of low-visibility decisionmaking
in criminal justice. With regard to sentencing reform, for instance, Stephen Schulhofer once
asked whether it is “inevitably wise to expose the problems and demand a political solution
when the questions mix value-laden elements with empirical assessments that the public is
unlikely to appreciate; when public opinion in any event is volatile, unformed, or illinformed; when the issues are emotionally charged and socially divisive?” Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 801–02 (1980). In the end,
Professor Schulhofer concluded that the force of these arguments “seems to me insufficient
to override the traditional virtues of exposure and accountability in the context of the current
debate over sentencing reform,” although he found “it unnecessary to consider the more
elusive question whether low visibility techniques, even if attractive on tactical grounds, are
consistent with accepted principles of democratic government.” Id. at 803, 806.
80
See Erik Luna, Hydraulic Pressures and Slight Deviations, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
133, 176–79.
81
See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586 (2005).
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serving justice than serving a prosecutor’s self-interest, whether it be
enhancing career prospects by amassing convictions and aggregate
sentences—more “notches on the gun,” to use a phrase from Ed Meese’s
keynote address—or simply lightening the caseload to avoid stress and
overtime.82 As for the aforementioned deterrence argument, even the
instrumentally minded among us might find unpalatable the exploitation of
an unwitting citizenry for purposes of crime control.83 After all, no one
likes being duped by the government.84
V. OVERT DECRIMINALIZATION
For these and other reasons, the secret law of prosecutorial
decriminalization presents a crisis of legitimacy. But what if the
decisionmaking process was open and honest, not hidden from the general
population and those individuals subject to its strictures? Imagine an
elected district attorney conveying to his constituency the rules or principles
that will be used in exercising prosecutorial discretion, stating with a degree
of specificity the conditions under which his office will not prosecute
particular crimes or seek certain punishments. This type of overt
prosecutorial decriminalization might avoid the aforementioned problems
associated with secrecy, and, conceivably, it could better serve some of the
core values of the rule of law.
Like the critique of overcriminalization, there is a scholarly pedigree to
the idea of articulating the grounds for exercising prosecutorial discretion.
“Would it not be a helpful addition,” Frank Remington asked a quarter
century ago, “to try to specify those [criminal] provisions that should be
fully enforced and those allowing discretion to enforce and, if discretion is
allowed, indicate by whom that choice can be made and in accordance with
what standards?”85
82

See, e.g., Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Looking Back and at the Challenges Ahead, in
THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 57, at 434.
83
The practice also has an uncomfortable resemblance to the enforcement of England’s
“bloody code” of the eighteenth century and the doctrine of crime by “analogy” in
communist dictatorships, both of which sought to cow the masses into conformity. See
Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME
AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17 (Allen Lane ed., 1975); Susan Finder,
The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 145, 208–10
(1993).
84
Then again, some people may prefer to adopt a “sausage theory” of criminal justice:
they don’t want to know how law enforcement is using its discretion—how the sausage is
made, so to speak—they just want low crime and safe streets. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 362–63 (1993).
85
Frank J. Remington, The Future of the Substantive Criminal Law Codification
Movement—Theoretical and Practical Concerns, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 867, 893 (1988).
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Although some statutes should be fully enforced, an unthinking enforcement of other
statutes will not add to the quality of law enforcement nor achieve the purpose the
legislature had in enacting the statute. In dealing with serious crime, crimes which
routinely result in arrest, the most important decisions are made by the prosecutor. . . .
What the substantive law-in-action is, largely depends what the prosecutor says it is.
Yet insufficient attention has been given to this fact. . . . Dealing with the issue is
crucial to the achievement of a substantive criminal code, fair and effective both [on]
86
the books and in practice.

Overt prosecutorial decriminalization has not been adopted in any
comprehensive fashion, but there are examples that roughly comport with
the idea.
In June 2010, the new district attorney of Philadelphia, Seth Williams,
launched the Small Amount of Marijuana (SAM) program. 87 Pursuant to
this initiative, arrests for possession of up to thirty grams of marijuana are
no longer prosecuted as misdemeanors, which could result in up to thirty
days incarceration, a $500 fine, and a permanent criminal record.88 Instead,
low-level marijuana offenders in Philadelphia complete a three-hour drugabuse class, which costs them $200, and their records are expunged. In the
program’s first year, more than 4,000 cases were diverted out of the
criminal justice system, saving millions of dollars that otherwise would
have been consumed by legal actors in court proceedings.89 Interestingly,
the SAM program was the product of a collaboration between the district
attorney’s office and the state judiciary,90 both of which were seeking to
reduce an overloaded criminal docket and its detrimental effects in more
serious cases.91 In addition, it has been suggested that the program could
help rectify the racially skewed patterns of marijuana arrests in
Philadelphia.92

86

Id. at 893–94.
See William Bender, D.A.: Philly’s New Pot Policy Just Makes Sense . . . and Saves
Dollars, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, July 8, 2011, at 6; see also Craig R. McCoy, Nancy Phillips &
Dylan Purcell, Philadelphia Plans Fines for Use of Marijuana, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 5,
2010, at A1; Peter Mucha, Marijuana Leniency Starts Today, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 8,
2010), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/special_packages/inquirer/courts-reform/201006
08_Marijuana_leniency_starts_today.html.
88
See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-104(1)(vii) (2003); 204 PA. CODE § 303.15 (2008).
89
Bender, supra note 87.
90
Letters: Municipal Court Played a Big Role in Small Amount of Marijuana Program,
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 3, 2011, at 18; McCoy et al., supra note 87.
91
For instance, an investigative report had found that almost two-thirds of defendants in
Philadelphia charged with violent crimes avoided conviction on all charges. Craig R.
McCoy, Nancy Phillips & Dylan Purcell, Justice: Delayed, Dismissed, Denied, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Dec. 13, 2009, at A1.
92
See McCoy et al., supra note 87 (noting this claim, given “Philadelphia police data
show” that “[m]ore than 80 percent typically have been of African Americans”).
87
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Although the prosecutor in charge of the SAM program apparently
cringes at the word “decriminalization,”93 in reality it fits the foregoing
definition of prosecutorial decriminalization. By contrast, prosecutorial
decriminalization of marijuana possession in Seattle, Washington, has been
both unabashed and clearly supported by popular will. Local voters
approved a referendum in 2003 that made marijuana the lowest priority for
law enforcement, but the then-city attorney continued to prosecute
possession cases.94 In 2010, a new city attorney, Pete Holmes, came into
office on a platform that included ending the prosecution of low-level
marijuana possession. So although it remains a crime under state law—
possessing less than forty grams is a misdemeanor punishable by up to
ninety days incarceration and a $1,000 fine95—Seattle’s local prosecutor
has decriminalized this conduct with the apparent support of his
constituency.
Another instance of prosecutorial decriminalization concerns the
nation’s toughest anti-recidivist scheme. Under California’s “three strikes”
law, an individual previously convicted of two serious or violent felonies
(as defined by statute) who then commits another felony faces a mandatory
twenty-five-years-to-life sentence.96 The law’s most draconian feature is
that the last “strike” can be any felony, including petty theft with a prior
larceny conviction. The resulting injustices have become embarrassing,
even to some law-and-order proponents, with defendants receiving virtual
life sentences for, among other things, stealing golf clubs and shoplifting
videotapes.97 After taking office in 2000, Los Angeles District Attorney
Steve Cooley became the first chief prosecutor in California to announce a
written policy stating that a life sentence would not be sought when the
defendant’s current crime is not a violent or serious felony.98 This special
directive also provided guidelines for dismissing qualifying convictions in
93

See Bender, supra note 87.
See Emily Heffter, Seattle’s New City Attorney to Dismiss Cases of Pot Possession,
SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 15, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/
2010808085_marijuana16m.html; see also Pete Holmes, Washington State Should Lead on
Marijuana Legalization, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/
html/opinion/2014247491_guest17holmes.html.
95
See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.92.030, 69.50.4014 (2011).
96
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (1998).
97
See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
77 (2003). Although his punishment was subsequently reduced, one defendant received a
life sentence for stealing a piece of pizza. See Jack Leonard, “Pizza Thief” Walks the Line,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at A1.
98
See L.A. COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, THREE STRIKES POLICY: SPECIAL
DIRECTIVE (Dec. 19, 2000), http://da.co.la.ca.us/3strikes.htm [hereinafter L.A. THREE
STRIKES POLICY]; see also Mandatory Sentencing in California: Cooley’s Law, ECONOMIST,
July 31, 2010, at 24.
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other cases. “As prosecutors, it is our legal and ethical obligation to
exercise this discretion in a manner that assures proportionality,
evenhanded application, predictability and consistency,” the directive’s
preamble points out. “Proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion protects
society and preserves confidence in and respect for the criminal justice
system.”99 Toward this end, the preamble notes that the district attorney’s
office will closely monitor the policy’s implementation and effects.100
Prosecutorial decriminalization is not limited to adult defendants but
also extends into the juvenile justice system. The practice of “sexting”—
children sharing sexually explicit photos of themselves via cell phone or the
internet—has become a widespread problem.101 Although juveniles might
not appreciate that such behavior can be criminal under child pornography
laws, and despite the fact that the offenders are properly seen as victims,
too, a number of jurisdictions have witnessed teens being charged for
sexting.102 But in light of “the unique characteristics and possible long term
effects” of these cases, Mathias Heck, the prosecuting attorney in Dayton,
Ohio, organized and implemented a program for teens accused of sexting
that diverted them out of the justice system.103 Cases are screened for
eligibility using factors that might indicate serious delinquency, such as the
use of force or illegal substances to obtain the photos. If eligible juveniles
meet the program’s requirements (e.g., relinquishing their cell phones and
performing community service), charges are not filed or are dismissed. In
this way, potential felonies under state law are removed from the system.104
Overt prosecutorial decriminalization is susceptible to a variety of
critiques,105 some intertwined with the arguments in favor of
99

L.A. THREE STRIKES POLICY, supra note 98.
See id.
101
See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Eraker, Stemming Sexting: Sensible Legal Approaches to
Teenagers’ Exchange of Self-Produced Pornography, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555, 557
(2010); Elizabeth M. Ryan, Note, Sexting: How the State Can Prevent a Moment of
Indiscretion from Leading to a Lifetime of Unintended Consequences for Minors and Young
Adults, 96 IOWA L. REV. 357, 360 (2010); JoAnne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate
Teenagers’ Constitutional Rights?, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 951, 952 (2011).
102
See, e.g., Sweeny, supra note 101, at 957–59; see also Stephen F. Smith, Jail for
Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505,
513 (2008).
103
Mathias H. Heck, Sexting and Charging Juveniles?: Balancing the Law and Bad
Choices, PROSECUTOR, Jan.–Mar. 2009, at 29.
104
See id.
105
For instance, in the federal system, overt prosecutorial decriminalization might be
seen as violating the President’s responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Kevin S. Marshall, Free Enterprise and the Rule
of Law: The Political Economy of Executive Discretion (Efficiency Implications of
Regulatory Enforcement Strategies), 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 235, 239 n.11 (2010)
100
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overcriminalization and low-visibility discretionary decisionmaking.106 The
above examples also raise practical considerations. As discussed, chief
prosecutors are enormously powerful officials, but they are still political
actors whose decisions can be condemned by bitter opponents and
undermined by other actors in the criminal justice system. When Seth
Williams announced the SAM program, the previous Philadelphia District
Attorney, Lynn Abraham, ridiculed his decision: “‘Welcome to
Philadelphia, Light Up a Joint’ may just be our new slogan,” she gibed.
“Local gangs and marijuana growers everywhere are positively
overjoyed.”107 Likewise, the Philadelphia Police Department initially
appeared less than thrilled about the new program, with a police spokesman
asserting that officers would continue to stop and arrest individuals for
marijuana possession: “Whether or not they make it through the charging
process, that’s up to the D.A.”108
Prosecutorial decriminalization can also generate questions of
consistency—temporal, geographical, and topical. Consider L.A. District
Attorney Steve Cooley’s policy for enforcing the three strikes law.
Between 2000 and 2007, his office dismissed strikes in more than 70% of
the cases where defendants were eligible for enhanced sentences under the
recidivist statute.109 But this policy could not help the 1,700 or so inmates
who received life sentences under Cooley’s predecessor.110 Nor does it
change the approach taken by district attorneys in other California
jurisdictions, including those adjacent to Los Angeles where prosecutors
pursue life sentences in every eligible case.111 Nor does an instance of overt
(noting similar duties on state governors). To be sure, executive officials may have no
authority to refuse to perform “ministerial” duties mandated by legislation. See, e.g.,
Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 595 (1838); Louis Fisher, Signing Statements:
Constitutional and Practical Limits, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 183, 184–86 (2007). But
faithful execution of criminal law should not be confused with the idea of full enforcement,
that is, officials must investigate all known or knowable offenses within their jurisdiction
and then prosecute them to the maximum extent allowed by law. This notion has long been
recognized to be a myth—one which has only become more ridiculous with each new act of
overcriminalization. See, e.g., PACKER, supra note 6, at 286; Kadish, supra note 1, at 907;
see also DAVIS, supra note 34, at 165.
106
See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
107
Mucha, supra note 87; see also McCoy et al., supra note 87.
108
McCoy et al., supra note 87 (quoting police spokesman).
109
See Michael Romano, Divining the Spirit of California’s Three Strikes Law, 22 FED.
SENT’G REP. 171, 173 (2010).
110
See Michael Romano, Striking Back: Using Death Penalty Cases to Fight
Disproportionate Sentences Imposed Under California’s Three Strikes Law, 21 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 311, 330 n.88 (2010).
111
Romano, supra note 109, at 173. As this article was going to press, California voters
adopted a ballot initiative modifying the state’s three strikes law to require a life sentence
only when a defendant’s current conviction is for a violent or serious offense. The change
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decriminalization mean that a prosecutor will advocate similar policies
elsewhere or oppose overcriminalization more generally. For example,
District Attorney Cooley has been an outspoken opponent of medical
marijuana and threatened to ignore any contrary municipal laws;112 he also
helped pen the argument against Proposition 19, the 2010 California ballot
initiative that would have legalized marijuana possession by adults.113
Such differences are not inherently condemnable, however. In fact,
variances in policy, across jurisdictions and among subjects, can be seen as
beneficial under theories of federalism and localism. In a pluralistic
society, citizens in different communities are likely to have distinct views
on the substance and procedure of criminal justice. The closer a
government is to its constituents and the greater the opportunity for citizens
to be involved in the decisionmaking process, the more likely that any given
policy choice will be attuned to community preferences.114 Counties and
cities might even become laboratories of experimentation in criminal
justice.115 If nothing else, citizens can vote with their feet (assuming they
are not shackled), travelling to a different community that adopts policies
more in line with their individual preferences.116 If someone dislikes the
acts of prosecutorial decriminalization by Messrs. Williams, Holmes,
Cooley, or Heck, their opportunities to lobby for change or relocate
elsewhere are far greater than if the decisions had been made at the state or
national level.
VI. PROSECUTORIAL DECRIMINALIZATION ABROAD
Comparisons between the United States and Europe can be
enlightening for myriad reasons, not least of which are the marked
differences on the other side of the Atlantic. The most disturbing
manifestations of overcriminalization, especially the sheer breadth of penal

also authorizes resentencing for inmates currently serving life sentences if their third strike
conviction was not for a serious or violent offense. See, e.g., Marisa Lagos & Ellen Huet,
‘Three strikes’ law changes approved by wide margin, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2012, at A14.
112
See, e.g., John Hoeffel, D.A. Chides L.A. Council, Says He’ll Target Pot Stores, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at A1.
113
See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF PROPOSITION 19, at 16–17 (2010),
available at http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig2010/general/pdf/english/19-arg-rebuttals.pdf.
114
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1510 (1987).
115
Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
116
See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design, 28
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 202 (2011).

2012]

PROSECUTORIAL DECRIMINALIZATION

807

codes, are largely unheard of in European systems.117 Indeed, at the same
time that scholars of domestic criminal law were decrying
overcriminalization, leading comparativists were advocating the
examination of continental criminal justice to help America evolve “beyond
the Neanderthal stage.”118 The most prominent debate in this area
concerned the civil law principle of legality (mandatory prosecution), which
was forwarded by several distinguished academics as a means to tame
prosecutorial discretion in the United States.119
However, recent works have demonstrated that European prosecutors,
like their American counterparts, are extremely powerful and possess more
discretion than previously thought possible.120 What is more, this discretion
is being exercised in response to a common problem on both continents: too
117

See Fernando Molina, A Comparison Between Continental European and AngloAmerican Approaches to Overcriminalization and Some Remarks on How to Deal with It, 14
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 123, 127 (2011). Dean Molina states:
When I received the invitation to participate in a symposium about overcriminalization, my first
thought was that this presented me with an excellent opportunity to share, with foreign
colleagues, concerns about a common problem. However, after reading a provocative article by
Erik Luna about the overcriminalization phenomenon, especially his amazing catalogue of
actions that are considered criminal in the United States, I began to doubt whether, despite
talking about the same topic, we are really talking about the same problem. . . . After reading
Douglas Husak’s book on overcriminalization in Anglo-American law, the suspicions that
Luna’s article aroused in me were confirmed. Undoubtedly, most of the overcriminalization
questions that arise in the United States are completely unknown to us. They are not a cause of
concern to us not because we haven’t thought about them, but because we have already solved
those problems.

Id. at 123–24. But cf. VOLKER KREY & OLIVER WINDGÄTTER, RECHTSPOLITISCHES F. [LEGAL
POL’Y F.], THE UNTENABLE SITUATION OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW: AGAINST QUANTITATIVE
OVERLOADING, QUALITATIVE OVERCHARGING AND THE OVEREXPANSION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 58 (2012).
118
Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing
Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 361, 374 (1977); see also Richard S. Frase,
Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do
It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 543 (1990);
Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American
Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 317
(1995); Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Lessons of Comparative Criminal Procedure, 15 AM. U. L.
REV. 341, 348 (1966).
119
See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 34; LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1977); John
H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439
(1974). Compare Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision
in Three “Inquisitorial” Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J 240 (1977), with
John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: “Myth” and
Reality, 87 YALE L.J 1549 (1978).
120
See JÖRG-MARTIN JEHLE & MARIANNE WADE, COPING WITH OVERLOADED CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS: THE RISE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER ACROSS EUROPE (2005); THE
PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 57; Luna & Wade, supra note 38,
at 1428.
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many cases and not enough time and resources. As it turns out, European
prosecutors have dealt with their overloaded systems by effectively
adjudicating cases and decriminalizing conduct. Sometimes this is done in
an obscure fashion, posing the type of legitimacy issues facing American
prosecution; but at other times and in other places, such discretionary
decisionmaking is exercised openly and honestly. Here, I will briefly
mention two examples of overt decriminalization, one from the Netherlands
and the other from England. Like the United States, these nations have
traditionally recognized prosecutorial discretion (also known as the
principle of opportunity).
The comparison raises intriguing questions and possibilities, as well as
some potential pitfalls. For instance, although Dutch prosecutors are
hierarchically subordinate to a cabinet-level executive (the Minister of
Justice), they are officially members of the judiciary and perceive their duty
as a magisterial one, which requires non-partisan truth-seeking in the
tradition of continental law.121 Even members of the Crown Prosecution
Service, practicing in the birthplace of adversarial adjudication, are not
nearly as partisan in their mindset as prosecutors (and defense counsel)
operating in America’s distinctively combative criminal process.122 Despite
these and other important differences, however, prosecutors in the United
States and Europe are relatively comparable—not apples and oranges, so to
speak, but different types of apples—where the two groups have parallel
roles, powers, and impacts on individuals and society as a whole.
The first foreign example involves rules for marijuana cases in the
Netherlands, which more than any other nation uses guidelines to inform
the decisions not only of prosecutors, but also those of police, judges, and,
most importantly, the public.123 When the topic of marijuana in the
Netherlands comes up, Americans almost invariably assume that the
country’s legislature has decriminalized drug sales, thereby allowing the
existence of Amsterdam’s famous “coffee shops.” In truth, the use,
possession, and distribution of marijuana is illegal by statute,124 but the

121

See, e.g., Peter J.P. Tak, The Dutch Prosecutor: A Prosecuting and Sentencing
Officer, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 57, at 135, 135–
36.
122
See, e.g., Chris Lewis, The Evolving Role of the English Crown Prosecution Service,
in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 57, at 214; Luna & Wade,
supra note 57, at 439.
123
See, e.g., Tak, supra note 121, at 139, 144–46.
124
See Opium Act (Opiumwet), Stb. 1976, art. 2,
available at
http://www.cannabisbureau.nl/en/doc/pdf/Dutch%20Opium_Act_30556.pdf; see also Why
Are Coffee Shops Allowed?, OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/
english/verzamel/frequently_asked/why_are_coffee_shops/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2012)
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Dutch Public Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie) has issued rules as
to when a case will or will not be prosecuted.125 The main features of law
enforcement policy and its application to drugs are summarized as follows:
The discretionary principle is an important factor in Dutch criminal law. It allows the
Public Prosecution Service to waive criminal proceedings in the public interest. Law
enforcement policy gives a high priority to large-scale trafficking in all kinds of drugs
and dealing in hard drugs. Sale and possession of cannabis for personal use are much
lower priorities. Details of these priorities are published in official guidelines. Dutch
policy on law enforcement is therefore more explicit than in some other countries,
126
which operate along the same lines in practice.

Specifically, coffee shop owners may stock up to 500 grams of
marijuana and will not be prosecuted for selling the drug, so long as: (1)
they do not sell more than five grams per customer per day; (2) they do not
sell “hard” drugs; (3) they do not advertise drugs; (4) they ensure that their
shop and patrons do not cause a nuisance in the vicinity; and (5) they do not
sell marijuana to persons under the age of eighteen or allow them on the
premises.127 If these rules are not observed, the coffee shop can be closed
down and the proprietors are liable to be prosecuted.128 Moreover, Dutch
municipalities may apply different rules, including rejecting coffee shops in
their jurisdiction, limiting the number of shops, or placing further
restrictions on the amount of marijuana that may be stocked.129 The
guidelines thus represent an important model of overt prosecutorial

(noting that “possession and sale of small quantities of cannabis in coffee shops are offences
under the Opium Act”).
125
See What Are the Rules Governing Coffee Shops, and How Are They Enforced?,
OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/verzamel/frequently_
asked/what_are_the_rules/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Rules Governing Coffee
Shops]; see also Robert J. MacCoun, What Can We Learn From the Dutch Cannabis
Coffeeshop System?, 106 ADDICTION 1899, 1900 (2011); NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFF., FAQ DRUGS: A GUIDE TO DUTCH POLICY (2008), available at
http://www.minbuza.nl/en/appendices/you-and-the-netherlands/about-the-netherlands/
ethical-issues/faq-drugs.html; Frequently Asked Questions About the Dutch Drugs Policy,
OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/frequently_asked/ (last
visited Mar. 25, 2012).
126
What Are the Main Features of Dutch Policy on Law Enforcement?, OPENBAAR
MINISTERIE, http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/verzamel/frequently_asked/what_
are_the_main/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
127
Rules Governing Coffee Shops, supra note 125.
128
Id.
129
See id.; Do Different Municipalities Apply Different Rules?, OPENBAAR MINISTERIE,
http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/verzamel/frequently_asked/do_different/
(last
visited Mar. 25, 2012); Why Are Fewer Coffee Shops Operating?, OPENBAAR MINISTERIE,
http://www.om.nl/vast_menu_blok/english/verzamel/frequently_asked/why_are_fewer_
coffee/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
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decriminalization, struck at the national level but still allowing substantial
local decisionmaking as to the community impact.
The second foreign example concerns the rules issued by the Crown
Prosecution Service (CPS) for prosecuting assisted-suicide cases.130 Under
British law, suicide is legal but assisting in suicide is a specific offense
punishable by up to fourteen years’ imprisonment.131 Although assisted
suicide was rarely prosecuted, cases denominated as “mercy killings” had
been pursued.132 The issue was further complicated by so-called suicide
tourism, where individuals might aid the terminally ill in travelling to other
countries that have decriminalized euthanasia.133 In the 2009 Purdy case,
the British House of Lords took up a challenge to assisted-suicide
prosecutions based on the European Convention on Human Rights.134 In
particular, Article 8 of the European Convention provides that any
restrictions on the right to private life must be “in accordance with the
law,”135 where law has been interpreted to include sub-statutory and
unwritten rules of enforcement.136
According to the British Law Lords, the legal rules must be
“sufficiently accessible to the individual who is affected by the restriction,
and sufficiently precise to enable him to understand its scope and foresee
the consequences of his actions so that he can regulate his conduct without
breaking the law.”137 In this context, the terminally ill appellant was
seeking information “so that she can take a decision that affects her private
life” and “make an informed decision as to whether or not to ask for her
husband’s assistance” without exposing him to the risk of prosecution.138
Because the existing statutory law did not provide this information and the
requisite level of foreseeability, the court’s opinion called upon the Director

130

For an in-depth discussion of the Crown Prosecution Service, see Lewis, supra note

122.
131

Suicide Act, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 60, §§ 1, 2 (1961) (Eng. & Wales).
See, e.g., Colin Fernandez, Devoted Mother Kay Gilderdale Charged with Attempted
Murder of Paralysed Daughter Who Was Bed-Riden for 17 Years, DAILY MAIL ONLINE
(U.K.) (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1170522/Kay-Gilderdalecharged-attempted-murder-paralysed-daughter.html.
133
See, e.g., Alison Langley, ‘Suicide Tourists’ Go to the Swiss for Help in Dying, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2003, at A3; More Britons Seeking Suicide Help, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7732640.stm.
134
See R. (Purdy) v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [2010] 1 A.C. 345 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
135
See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
136
See Purdy, [2010] 1 A.C., at ¶ 41 (Lord Hope).
137
Id. at ¶ 40.
138
Id. at ¶¶ 30–31.
132
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of Public Prosecutions “to clarify what his position is as to the factors that
he regards as relevant for and against prosecution.”139
After the decision was announced, the CPS circulated draft guidelines,
received public input, and then issued a synopsis of the relevant law and a
set of factors in prosecuting an assisted-suicide case, such as whether the
victim was under the age of eighteen, whether the suspect had a history of
violence or abuse of the victim, and whether the suspect had been paid to
assist in the suicide.140 Embedded in the guidelines is a disclaimer that
“[t]his policy does not in any way ‘decriminalise’ the offense of
encouraging or assisting suicide.”141 But as one leading scholar wrote, “the
main significance of [the Purdy] case is that it marks a step along the road
towards making assisted suicide legal,”142 and by decreasing the potential
scope of British statutory law, the CPS had effectively decriminalized
conduct that might otherwise be subject to prosecution.143
This prototype of a new “third arm of Anglo-Saxon Law”144 illustrates
the prospects for a dialogic process in prosecutorial decriminalization.
Here, the Law Lords prodded the CPS to institute a policy regarding
assisted suicide, which it did by promulgating rules amounting to
prosecutorial decriminalization. On this side of the Atlantic, American
jurists and scholars have argued for greater dialogue between the judicial
and political branches, with some U.S. Supreme Court decisions essentially

139
Id. at ¶ 55; see also id. at ¶¶ 16 (Lord Phillips), 64 (Baroness Hale), 84–86 (Lord
Brown), 99–102 (Lord Neuberger).
140
See DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., POLICY FOR
PROSECUTORS IN RESPECT OF CASES OF ENCOURAGING OR ASSISTING SUICIDE (2010),
available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.pdf;
see also DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., INTERIM POLICY FOR
PROSECUTORS IN RESPECT OF CASES OF ASSISTED SUICIDE (2009) [hereinafter INTERIM POLICY
FOR PROSECUTORS], available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_consultation.pdf;
DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., PUBLIC CONSULTATION EXERCISE
ON THE INTERIM POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS IN RESPECT OF CASES OF ASSISTED SUICIDE (2010),
available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_responses.pdf. However, it has been
argued that the guidelines still have not produced sufficient legal clarity. See, e.g., COMM’N
ON ASSISTED DYING, FINAL REPORT: THE CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF ASSISTED DYING IS
INADEQUATE & INCOHERENT 23 (2011), available at http://www.demos.co.uk/files/
476_CoAD_FinalReport_158x240_I_web_single-NEW_.pdf?1328113363.
141
DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, INTERIM POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 140, at
¶ 6.
142
J.R. Spencer, Assisted Suicide and the Discretion to Prosecute, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
493, 495 (2009).
143
See also COMM’N ON ASSISTED DYING, supra note 140, at 299 (noting that “[t]here is
now a broad public perception that assisted suicides that meet the criteria stipulated in the
DPP policy are effectively decriminalised”).
144
Lewis, supra note 122, at 220.
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pursuing such interaction.145 In the present context, the aforementioned
SAM program offers a small-scale example of interbranch dialogue in
prosecutorial decriminalization: Philadelphia’s district attorney sought input
from the state judiciary on the basic idea and then worked with the courts to
bring the program to fruition.146
With overt decriminalization, another type of dialogue may be
important as well—that between the officials formulating the policy and
parties with an interest in the end product. As noted, the CPS sought public
feedback on its proposed rules. After publishing an interim policy in
September 2009, the CPS initiated a twelve-week process of public
consultation, which resulted in over 4,800 responses from individuals and
organizations, including public health professionals, representatives of
religious groups, scholars, public servants, and legal and political actors.
These views were taken into account in making adjustments to the final
published policy.147 In the United States, administrative law provides a
wealth of experience on the rulemaking processes of executive agencies,
where the legitimacy of a given policy “depends in no small part upon the
openness, accessibility, and amenability of these officials to the needs and
ideas of the public from whom their ultimate authority derives, and upon
whom their commands must fall.”148 Although an APA-style system might
be unnecessary,149 the general lessons of American administrative law and
the experiences of prosecution offices, both at home and abroad, could
inform a thoughtful interactive process for formulating a policy of
prosecutorial decriminalization.
Presumably, the decision to undertake such a process would be
premised on the belief that a particular offense constitutes
overcriminalization and thus provides an appropriate target for prosecutorial
decriminalization. As noted earlier, this judgment may depend on whether
the crime is deficient in harmful wrongdoing;150 and on this issue, there
145

See Erik Luna, Constitutional Road Maps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1125, 1126
(2000).
146
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
147
See Lewis, supra note 122, at 224; DPP’s Introductory Remarks on Assisted Suicide
Policy, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/
dpps_introductory_remarks_on_assisted_suicide_policy/.
148
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400–01 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
149
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2006); see also Erik Luna,
Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 590–623 (2000).
150
The issue is sufficiently clear to me from my own worldview, which holds that the
fundamental unit of moral analysis is the individual, who possesses a right of self-ownership
and the freedom to engage generally in capitalist acts with other consenting adults. See
Luna, Overcriminalization Phenomenon, supra note 14, at 732–39. But I recognize that
many (perhaps most) Americans will disagree with this philosophy or its applications.
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appears to be a consensus in a number of areas of overcriminalization, as
evidenced by the bunking of otherwise strange bedfellows.151 With some
topics, however, the prospect of agreement seems remote. Consider, for
instance, insider trading: Although a respectable argument can be made that
it should be no crime at all, neither legislative nor prosecutorial
decriminalization of insider trading has any chance in the current political
environment.152 Consider also one of Professor Kadish’s original examples
of overcriminalization—abortion.153
Although the issue has been
constitutionalized by the Supreme Court, it is hard to believe a consensus
could be reached today that abortion lacks harmful wrongdoing.154
The United States is hardly the only nation that struggles with
normative issues of criminalization and decriminalization. At the time the
Law Lords decided Purdy, “it was clear that the [British] government did
not want to amend the law on assisted suicide due to its high public
sensitivity.”155 Since then, the case has generated voluminous debate,
including disagreement among intellectual heavyweights.156 For present
purposes, however, the pertinent question is whether it was advisable for
the Law Lords to require the Director of Public Prosecutions to announce
guidelines for bringing charges of assisted suicide, using Purdy as a means
to prompt an act of prosecutorial decriminalization. On this issue, one
scholar made a strong case for the prior opacity in discretionary
decisionmaking:
[A]ssisted suicide is a rare case. More particularly, it is a case where the real harm
sought to be avoided (advantage-taking, social pressure to die, and undervaluing the
lives of the terminally ill) is engendered by the formal permissibility of the act far
more than many instances of the act itself. Should the escorting of loved ones to
suicide clinics continue to take place under the radar, the threat of normalizing
controlled death and the danger of its abuse would not loom half as large as it does
against a background of open acceptance of that same practice. More certainly, by
continuing to hold out even an empty threat of censure, the law would not be forced

151

For example, the American Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the
Cato Institute, the Federalist Society, the Heritage Foundation, the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Washington Legal Foundation. See Fields &
Emshwiller, supra note 12, at A10; Liptak, supra note 12, at A1.
152
See, e.g., Alexandre Padilla, How Do We Think About Insider Trading? An
Economist’s Perspective on the Insider Trading Debate and Its Impact, 4 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 239, 240 (2008).
153
Kadish, Crisis of Overcriminalization, supra note 6, at 162–63.
154
I take no position here on this controversy.
155
Lewis, supra note 122, at 224.
156
Compare John Finnis, The Lords’ Eerie Swansong: A Note on R (Purdy) v. Director
of Public Prosecutions (Oxford, Legal Research Paper No. 31/2009 & Notre Dame Law
School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-39, 2009), with Jeremy Waldron, Torture,
Suicide, and Determination, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 13–19 (2010).
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into the undesirable position of classifying some but not other lives as potentially
worthless. In light of this, it is my view that the hitherto unofficial policy of non157
prosecution was the correct—indeed, the only viable—answer . . . .

The point is well taken. In some areas, an act of overcriminalization
may cover few cases, which are rarely if ever prosecuted, whereas the
potential negative consequences of overt decriminalization may be so
momentous that one might prefer a low-visibility act of discretionary mercy
to deal with each incident as it arises. Interestingly, the Netherlands has its
own history of struggling with problems of criminalization and
decriminalization, not only with provocative subjects such as abortion and
euthanasia, but also with regard to topics that seem considerably less
controversial.158 For example, the Dutch Cabinet pronounced a new policy
that would transform coffee shops into private clubs for the local market
only, with the goal of stemming drug tourism by foreigners.159 Robert
MacCoun described the change as startling, “because Dutch officials have
long resisted international pressure, standing by the coffeeshop model as an
expression of Dutch gedoogcultuur (‘culture of permissiveness’) and as a
pragmatic ‘least worst’ solution.”160
In general, however, the Netherlands has approached criminal justice
with a high degree of openness and an acceptance of what might appear
contradictory from afar.161 The Dutch legal culture recognizes that statutory
language may be inattentive to the practical necessities of implementation.
Deviations from an otherwise strict legislative text are filled by the concept
of beleid (policy), which achieves a “quasi-legislative” status when
expressed in guidelines, notes Dutch law professor Erhard Blankenburg.162
In Dutch understanding penal law is a goal oriented program authorizing the
authorities to punish undesired behavior. Prosecution is empowered to charge, not
required to do so. At the same time, however, the decision not to prosecute cannot be
taken at will: equal treatment under the law, the rules of nondiscrimination, and the
principle of predictability of legal action require police prosecutors to follow rules as
157

Kate Greasley, R(Purdy) v DPP and the Case for Wilful Blindness, 30 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 301, 323–24 (2010).
158
Erhard Blankenburg, Beleid—A Very Dutch Legal Term, 41 J. LEGAL PLURALISM &
UNOFFICIAL L. 65, 67–70 (1998).
159
See The Dutch Cabinet: Coffeeshop to Be a Private Club for the Local Market,
MINISTRY OF SEC. AND JUSTICE (May 27, 2011), http://www.government.nl/documents-andpublications/press-releases/2011/05/27/the-dutch-cabinet-coffeeshop-to-be-a-private-clubfor-the-local-market.html; see also David Jolly, Hague Court Clears Way for Dutch to Bar
Nonresidents From Buying Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2012, at A4 (discussing court
ruling upholding new policy, which took effect in the southern provinces on May 1, 2012,
and will apply to the entire nation in 2013).
160
MacCoun, supra note 125, at 1900 (footnote omitted).
161
See, e.g., id.
162
Blankenburg, supra note 158, at 66.
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to when they apply their penal powers. Thus internal rule making has to supplement
the legislative rule. Advocates may challenge the prosecutors’ decisions on the basis
of precedents and demand publication of the internal guidelines which legitimize
them. The pure theory of beleid requires every making of a rule to be based on
explicit authorization: we might call it a process which is legal but without
163
legislation.

Once formulated, beleid can be debated in local political arenas, such
as city councils and so-called triangular conferences. During these
conferences, the mayor, chief prosecutor, police chief, and oftentimes
interested individuals and groups meet to discuss criminal justice policy for
their community, as well as to coordinate with regional and national
policymakers.164 Moreover, beleid in guideline form provides a benchmark
by which to evaluate the performance of government officials, including
police and prosecutors. As such, beleid does not permit the government “to
close its eyes to deviations, but forces it to issue explicit guidelines within
which toleration is handled.”165 The guidelines and their application are
then open to political and judicial scrutiny as to whether the deviations from
statutory law are justified by standard pragmatic rationales.
Of course, a divergence between the law on the books and the law as
enforced is not unique to the Netherlands. All legal cultures tolerate some
deviations from strict rules; the only question is the approach taken toward
the resulting divide. Some legal cultures will simply ignore a gulf between
formal law and its enforcement, and others will deal with any contradictions
on a case-by-case basis. Both approaches require low-visibility exercises of
discretion to cope with overloaded criminal justice systems. By contrast,
“pragmatic legal cultures ask for the explication of a policy line (beleid)
along which toleration is handled.”166 In their daily lives, the Dutch are
known for their open curtains,167 both literal and figurative, and this
openness carries over to public affairs, as evidenced by overt
decriminalization through prosecutorial guidelines.
VII. CONCLUSION (AND A CAUTIONARY TALE)
If I had my druthers, the American phenomenon of overcriminalization
would be dealt with legislatively, not by executive action. But in an
overcriminalized world, created by unrepentant lawmakers and tolerated by
163
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deferential judges, there are simply too many cases and not enough
resources to try them all. Prosecutors are already decriminalizing conduct
through their discretionary decisionmaking, and, as I said, they have no
other choice but to do so. Accepting this as a given, the basic issue is
whether prosecutorial decriminalization should remain veiled and ad hoc,
generating a secret administrative law of criminal justice; or whether
instead prosecutorial decriminalization should be overt, promulgated in a
principled fashion, so that both law enforcement and the public know where
the line stands between what is criminal and what is not. For now, I will
take the latter—prosecutorial decriminalization as a public covenant—
guiding law enforcement, communicating honestly with the citizenry, and
allowing individuals to conform their behavior to the effective scope of the
law.
This approach is more consistent with the rule of law, at least where
that much-debated concept is predicated on the values of procedural justice
rather than the myth of full enforcement.
Overt prosecutorial
decriminalization might even serve the principles that sometimes animate
the rule of law. It acknowledges the important role played by the executive
in a system of separated and coequal branches, where prosecutors are not
simply clerical workers but have a distinct constitutional role. Overt
prosecutorial decriminalization is also consistent with the core value of
federalism, the idea that criminal law enforcement should be local to the
maximum extent possible, because government closer to the people is more
likely to serve the needs of a particular jurisdiction. Most of all, overt
prosecutorial decriminalization increases transparency, allowing the public
to see into the black box that is the criminal justice system.
With that said, a word of caution is in order: As unbelievable as it
sounds, American prosecutors are not bound by their own rules. In 1979,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that law enforcement’s violation of agency
regulations did not provide a basis for evidentiary exclusion.168 Because it
is up to the executive branch to formulate such rules, making them litigable
in criminal cases might result in “fewer and less protective regulations” (or
so the Court argued).169 Since then, the lower courts have uniformly
rejected legal claims based on federal prosecutors failing to abide by
guidelines issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ).170 What makes this
particularly galling is the fact that the DOJ has invoked its own guidelines
168
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in congressional hearings as a reason why new statutory restrictions would
be unnecessary.171 Most recently, it argued that a federal statute should be
upheld because of the DOJ’s tighter construction of the law and the promise
that it “neither has brought nor will bring a prosecution” under a broader
interpretation.172
Unless a prosecution office is willing to police itself, overt
prosecutorial decriminalization can set a trap for the legally untutored. A
perfect example is provided by the ongoing saga of medical marijuana. To
date, eighteen states have decriminalized the medicinal use of the drug, with
laws defining eligibility and allowing some means of patient access (i.e.,
home cultivation, dispensaries, or both).173 However, the federal Controlled
Substances Act still lists marijuana as having “no currently accepted
medical use in treatment,”174 at least for purposes of the U.S. Code, and thus
suppliers of the drug are amenable to federal prosecution without
exception.175 Although the Bush Administration had engaged in an
aggressive enforcement strategy regarding medical marijuana, then-Senator
Obama promised to stop the raids on growers and dispensaries when he
became America’s chief executive.176 Shortly after the new administration
took office, a White House spokesman reiterated President Obama’s
position that “federal resources should not be used to circumvent state
laws” concerning medical marijuana.177 The new U.S. Attorney General,
Eric Holder, also made clear that federal law enforcement policy would not
include raids on medical marijuana organizations.178
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In October 2009, Holder’s chief lieutenant, David Ogden, issued a
memorandum emphasizing that federal prosecution must be efficient and
rational in the use of limited investigative and prosecutorial resources.179
U.S. Attorneys were instructed that the general rule should be nonprosecution of “individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous
compliance with existing state laws that provide for medical use of
marijuana.”180 To help distinguish legitimate medical marijuana activity
from illegal drug trafficking, the memo set out several factors that might
indicate a federal interest in prosecution, such as unlawful possession or use
of firearms, the presence of violence, sales to minors, and ties between
marijuana and other criminal enterprises.181 The document concluded by
stating that it does not “legalize” marijuana—but if it were abided by, the
Ogden Memo would be a form of prosecutorial decriminalization of
marijuana used for medical purposes under state law. And that is precisely
how some medical marijuana providers and state government officials
understood the national law enforcement policy of the Obama
Administration.182
An entirely different message would be sent in the coming months and
years, however, one backed by the full force of the U.S. Code. Federal law
enforcement began cracking down on medical marijuana dispensaries,
prosecuting the proprietors and seeking forfeiture of business properties.183
When Washington was considering legislation to license marijuana growers
and dispensaries, the state’s two U.S. Attorneys threatened to prosecute
“vigorously” those who participate in the manufacture and distribution of
marijuana, “even if such activities are permitted under state law.”184
Ominously, they claimed that “state employees who conducted activities
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mandated by the Washington legislative proposals would not be immune
from liability under” federal drug law.185
Recently, a federal district court pointed to the Ogden Memo’s
disclaimers as proof that a “reasonable person . . . could not conclude that
the federal government was somehow authorizing the production and
consumption of marijuana for medical purposes.”186 Indeed, the crackdown
might be squared with a tight reading of the Ogden Memo, at least when
supplemented by a subsequent DOJ memorandum.187 But for many people,
the change had the feel of a bait-and-switch with penal consequences.188
Overcriminalization is bad, but the perceived failure of law enforcement to
follow its own rules only makes things worse.189
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